Excellent Q&A! The comments about justice bring to mind a favorite quote by Norm Dewitt in a forgotten book titled *Epicurus and his Philosophy* (Minneapolis, 1954). In it Dewitt explains in just a few sentences why Epicureanism is vastly superior to the totality of Platonism:
"Geometry...inspired in the minds of men a new movement that was genuinely romantic. In geometry he [Plato] seemed to see absolute reason contemplating absolute truth, perfect precision of concept joined with finality of demonstration. He began to transfer the precise concepts of geometry to ethics and politics just as modern thinkers transferred the concepts of biological evolution to history and sociology. Especially enticing was the concept which we know as definition. This was a creation of the geometricians; they created it by defining straight lines, equilateral triangles, and other regular figures. If these can be defined, Plato tacitly reasoned, why not also justice, piety, temperance, and other virtues? This is reasoning by analogy, one of the trickiest of logical procedures. It holds good only between sets of true similars. Virtues and triangles are not true similars. It does not follow, therefore, because equilateral triangles can be precisely defined, that justice can be defined in the same way. Modern jurists warn against defining justice; it is what the court says it is from time to time.
The deceptiveness of analogy, however, does not prevent it from flourishing, and Plato committed himself to the use of it unreservedly. [...] The quest of a definition, of justice, for example, presumes the existence of the thing to be defined. If equilateral triangles did not exist, they certainly could not be defined. Assume that justice can be defined and at once it is assumed that justice exists just as equilateral triangles exist. Hence arose Plato's theory of ideas. The word *idea* means shape or form and he thought of abstract notions as having an independent existence just as geometrical figures exist, a false analogy.
The theory of ideas was rejected as an absurdity by the young Epicurus, because he was a materialist and denied all existences except atoms and space."
"Ah, you quote Norm Dewitt suggesting that Plato's analogy between geometry and virtues is 'deceptive.' Tell me, my friend, do you believe that justice has no independent reality beyond what a court declares? If so, how do we judge whether a court's ruling is just or unjust? Must we not have some higher measure by which to evaluate it?
You also assert that virtues cannot be defined as equilateral triangles can. Yet, how do we recognize justice in the first place if we lack some understanding—however imprecise—of what it is? If you deny the existence of justice as something definable, do you then deny its existence altogether, or do you hold it to be some ephemeral, subjective notion?
As for Epicurus, I wonder: if all that exists are atoms and space, then what is the nature of our reasoning and our values? Are they too mere configurations of atoms, without objective truth? And if so, how can he—or you—claim any superiority for his philosophy over mine?"
Another book that I recommend is the Swerve by Greenlatt; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Swerve. Oddly, I've been looking at Catherine's book for some time. I think I will take the plunge.
Excellent Q&A! The comments about justice bring to mind a favorite quote by Norm Dewitt in a forgotten book titled *Epicurus and his Philosophy* (Minneapolis, 1954). In it Dewitt explains in just a few sentences why Epicureanism is vastly superior to the totality of Platonism:
"Geometry...inspired in the minds of men a new movement that was genuinely romantic. In geometry he [Plato] seemed to see absolute reason contemplating absolute truth, perfect precision of concept joined with finality of demonstration. He began to transfer the precise concepts of geometry to ethics and politics just as modern thinkers transferred the concepts of biological evolution to history and sociology. Especially enticing was the concept which we know as definition. This was a creation of the geometricians; they created it by defining straight lines, equilateral triangles, and other regular figures. If these can be defined, Plato tacitly reasoned, why not also justice, piety, temperance, and other virtues? This is reasoning by analogy, one of the trickiest of logical procedures. It holds good only between sets of true similars. Virtues and triangles are not true similars. It does not follow, therefore, because equilateral triangles can be precisely defined, that justice can be defined in the same way. Modern jurists warn against defining justice; it is what the court says it is from time to time.
The deceptiveness of analogy, however, does not prevent it from flourishing, and Plato committed himself to the use of it unreservedly. [...] The quest of a definition, of justice, for example, presumes the existence of the thing to be defined. If equilateral triangles did not exist, they certainly could not be defined. Assume that justice can be defined and at once it is assumed that justice exists just as equilateral triangles exist. Hence arose Plato's theory of ideas. The word *idea* means shape or form and he thought of abstract notions as having an independent existence just as geometrical figures exist, a false analogy.
The theory of ideas was rejected as an absurdity by the young Epicurus, because he was a materialist and denied all existences except atoms and space."
Here is how I imagine Socrates would respond;
"Ah, you quote Norm Dewitt suggesting that Plato's analogy between geometry and virtues is 'deceptive.' Tell me, my friend, do you believe that justice has no independent reality beyond what a court declares? If so, how do we judge whether a court's ruling is just or unjust? Must we not have some higher measure by which to evaluate it?
You also assert that virtues cannot be defined as equilateral triangles can. Yet, how do we recognize justice in the first place if we lack some understanding—however imprecise—of what it is? If you deny the existence of justice as something definable, do you then deny its existence altogether, or do you hold it to be some ephemeral, subjective notion?
As for Epicurus, I wonder: if all that exists are atoms and space, then what is the nature of our reasoning and our values? Are they too mere configurations of atoms, without objective truth? And if so, how can he—or you—claim any superiority for his philosophy over mine?"
Another book that I recommend is the Swerve by Greenlatt; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Swerve. Oddly, I've been looking at Catherine's book for some time. I think I will take the plunge.